Introduction

Money laundering is a criminal offense committed to conceal or disguise the origin of assets obtained from a criminal act, making them appear to have been derived from lawful activities. As a proceeds-oriented crime, money laundering is fundamentally closely linked to the predicate crime that generated the assets in question. This connection has led to a debate regarding the status of TPPU within Indonesia’s criminal justice system—namely, whether TPPU is a follow-up crime, the existence of which depends on the proof of the predicate crime, or whether it is an independent crime that can be proven separately.

Issue

Based on the above discussion, the central issue addressed in this article is whether the criminal offense of money laundering can be proven independently without first proving or obtaining a judgment regarding the predicate crime that generated the assets subject to money laundering. This issue is significant because, conceptually, money laundering is a criminal offense closely tied to the existence of a predicate crime as the source of the illicit proceeds; however, on the other hand, Indonesian positive law, through its statutory provisions, allows for the prosecution and proof of money laundering without requiring prior proof of the predicate crime. Therefore, further study is needed regarding the status of money laundering within the Indonesian criminal justice system—whether it is an independent crime that stands on its own or a follow-up crime whose existence remains contingent upon the proof of the predicate offense.

Analysis

Money laundering is a crime related to assets derived from a specific predicate crime, which includes corruption, narcotics, terrorism, human trafficking, and other criminal offenses as fully set forth in Article 2(1) of Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering (hereinafter referred to as the “Money Laundering Law”). Such assets are then deposited, transferred, paid out, spent, donated, entrusted to a third party, taken abroad, exchanged, or subjected to other acts with the intent to conceal or disguise their origin so that they appear to be assets obtained lawfully. Based on this framework, some scholars classify money laundering as a “follow-up crime” because its existence logically depends on the presence of a predicate offense that generates the assets to be laundered. Without a predicate offense, there would be no proceeds of crime that could serve as the object of money laundering—a principle reflected in the anti-money laundering regime’s postulate that “There is no money laundering without predicate offenses.”

To put it simply, the understanding of money laundering as a follow-up crime to a predicate offense can be illustrated as follows:

The view that money laundering is a follow-up crime has been further reinforced by Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XIII/2015, which essentially states that money laundering is a subsequent criminal offense that follows the original criminal offense as an attempt to conceal or disguise the criminal origin of the assets, in such a way that it cannot be determined that the assets obtained were derived from a criminal offense. Therefore, money laundering cannot exist without an underlying criminal offense. However, in its ratio decidendi, the Court declared that the provisions of Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law remain constitutional and legally binding. This has led to an ongoing debate. The full text of Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law reads as follows:

Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law

“In order to conduct an investigation, prosecution, and trial regarding the criminal offense of money laundering, it is not necessary to first prove the underlying criminal offense.”

While it remains constitutionally valid and legally binding, the view that money laundering is an independent crime continues to emerge because there is still a relevant legal basis to support this argument, namely the existence of Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law. The assertion that money laundering is a standalone criminal offense, or an independent crime, can be demonstrated, among other things, by the difference in the objects of the predicate offense and the money laundering offense. Generally, the objects of the predicate offense are mens rea and actus reus, whereas the object of money laundering is property obtained as a result of a criminal offense.

The concept of money laundering as an independent crime, as stipulated in Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law, is also applied in several countries around the world and in international anti-money laundering standards, including the following:

The provisions of Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law or the provisions of prior legislation—namely Law No. 15 of 2002 as amended by Law No. 25 of 2003—are also frequently cited as the basis for asserting that, under certain circumstances, proving money laundering does not require waiting for the underlying criminal offense to become final and binding; indeed, it may even proceed without prior proof of the underlying criminal offense. This can be seen in judicial practice, which includes expert opinions and legal considerations stating that money laundering does not require proof of the predicate offense beforehand, as illustrated by the following court decisions:

• District Court Decision No. 1056/Pid.S/2005/PN.JKT.PST in conjunction with High Court Decision No. 211/Pid/2005/PT.DKI in the case of Le Mien Sumardi;
• District Court Decision No. 1252/Pid.B/2010/PN.JKT.SEL in conjunction with High Court Decision No. 08/Pid/TPK/2011/PT.DKI in conjunction with Supreme Court Decision No. 1454 K/PID. SUS/2011 in conjunction with Supreme Court Decision No. 279 PK/Pid.Sus/2012 in the case of Dr. Drs. Bahasyim Assifie, M.Si.;
• Court Decision No. 10/Pid.Sus/TPK/2014/PN.JKT.PST in conjunction with Court Decision No. 63/PID/TPK/2014/PT.DKI in conjunction with Supreme Court Decision No. 336 K/Pid.Sus/2015 in the case of M. Akil Mochtar.

Furthermore, Article 75 of the Money Laundering Law states, “If an investigator finds sufficient preliminary evidence of a money laundering offense and an underlying criminal offense, the investigator shall combine the investigation of the underlying criminal offense with that of the money laundering offense and notify the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK).” The provisions in the articles that have been systematically interpreted above provide a general overview of the perspective on proving money laundering offenses. Specifically, based on the description of the legal provisions above, the Anti-Money Laundering Law provides for at least three possible processes for proving money laundering, namely as follows:

1. Money laundering is proven following the conclusion of legal proceedings or the final adjudication of the predicate offense;
2. Money laundering is proven concurrently with the predicate offense as part of the same case; and
3. Money laundering is proven without first proving the predicate offense.

In Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XIII/2015, pages 204–205, regarding the validity of Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law, the Court held as follows:

“It is an injustice that a person who has clearly benefited from a money laundering offense is not prosecuted simply because the predicate offense has not yet been proven… however, money laundering does not stand alone; it must be linked to a predicate offense. How can there be a money laundering offense if there is no predicate offense? If the predicate offense cannot be proven first, that does not preclude the prosecution of the money laundering offense.”

Based on part of the Court’s reasoning (ratio decidendi) in that decision, it can be understood that the application of the money laundering evidence model without first proving the predicate offense is limited to certain conditions, namely: (i) this evidentiary mechanism is not intended as a deviation from the concept of a follow-up crime; and (ii) this mechanism is a judicial technique used to ensure that law enforcement can still be carried out against parties who benefit from or derive profit from the proceeds of a criminal offense, even if the predicate offense has not yet been proven. In that decision, Dr. Yunus Husein, S.H., L.LM. (Former Head of the Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis Center from 2002 to 2011), acting as an expert witness, explained that the independent nature of money laundering bears similarities to the legal framework for receiving stolen goods as stipulated in Article 480 of the Criminal Code (KUHP). According to him, the investigation of a receiving-stolen-goods case does not require that the perpetrator of the predicate offense—such as theft or robbery—be arrested or convicted first, and this view has been supported by various developing precedents.

The receiver in a receiving-stolen-goods case is not a principal perpetrator of the predicate offenses. Therefore, when addressing the issue of proving money laundering without first proving the predicate offense—taking into account the contextual interpretation of Article 480 of the Criminal Code—as mandated by Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XIII/2015, the context for applying money laundering as an independent crime—as stipulated in Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law—is when the case being prosecuted under money laundering involves a non-materiele dader. According to Afdal Yanuar in his book titled “Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture” non-materiele dader at a minimum:

1. Passive Money Laundering Offender (Article 5 of the Money Laundering Law);
2. Perpetrators of incitement to money laundering or complicity in money laundering who are not directly involved in the predicate offense (Article 3 of the Money Laundering Law in conjunction with Article 55(1)(2) of the Criminal Code or Article 3 of the Money Laundering Law in conjunction with Article 56 of the Criminal Code); or
3. A third-party money laundering perpetrator (not involved in the predicate offense) who is the principal perpetrator of the money laundering offense. Furthermore, the circumstances that may justify the prosecution of a non-materiele dader under Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law may arise from (i) the principal perpetrator of the predicate offense being a fugitive; or (ii) the case files regarding the principal perpetrator of the predicate offense and the non-materiele dader have been separated (splitsing) with concurrent or nearly concurrent legal proceedings.

Next, the question that arises is: what if it turns out that the perpetrator of the original criminal offense has already been tried and found not guilty of the original criminal offense? To answer this question, we must refer back to Article 173 of Law No. 20 of 2025 of the Republic of Indonesia on the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) as the basis for the enforcement of formal criminal law. In such a case, the KUHAP provides that the convicted person may file a claim for compensation and rehabilitation against the state with the court having jurisdiction over the relevant case, to be heard and decided by the same judge who presided over the criminal case. Pursuant to Article 173(5) of the KUHAP, the hearing on compensation follows the pretrial proceedings. The technical procedures for filing such a claim can be found in District Court Decision No. 98/Pid.Pra/2016/PN JKT.Sel regarding High Court Decision No. 50/PID/2014/PT DKI, which acquitted Andro Supriyanto, alias Andro, and Nurdin Prianto, alias Benges. In that pretrial ruling, Andro Supriyanto, alias Andro, acted as Petitioner I and Nurdin Prianto, alias Benges, acted as Petitioner II, while the Metro Jaya Regional Police, General Criminal Investigation Directorate of the Metro Jaya Regional Police, acted as Respondent I; the DKI Jakarta High Prosecutor’s Office acted as Respondent II; and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Minister of Finance, acted as Co-Respondent. The operative part of the ruling is as follows:

Considering that the consequences of rendering a judgment against a non-materiele dader before the principal perpetrator include compensation and rehabilitation, the author strongly recommends that, in cases where the material perpetrator of the underlying criminal offense is still located or known to exist, and the time gap between the handling of the case involving the non-materiele dader and that involving the material perpetrator is not too long, specifically regarding the imposition of a sentence by the panel of judges, the court should wait until the material perpetrator of the underlying criminal offense has been sentenced.

Conclusion

Money laundering under Indonesian criminal law is, in essence, still a follow-up crime because its existence requires the presence of assets derived from a predicate crime. However, Article 69 of the Money Laundering Law provides scope for the prosecution and enforcement of money laundering charges without first having to prove or obtain a conviction for the predicate crime, particularly to target parties who are not the direct perpetrators of the predicate crime but who benefit from the proceeds of that crime. Therefore, the status of money laundering under Indonesian criminal law is more accurately understood as an offense that is materially dependent on the predicate crime but procedurally independent in terms of its proof and enforcement. Consequently, this procedural independence does not automatically eliminate the material connection between money laundering and the predicate crime; thus, if the principal perpetrator of the predicate crime is subsequently tried and found not guilty, this may have legal consequences for parties who have already been sentenced in the money laundering case. In such circumstances, Article 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides a basis for the convicted person to file a claim for damages and rehabilitation against the state through the court with jurisdiction over the relevant case, with the proceedings conducted as a pretrial hearing by the same judge who presided over the criminal case.